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STUDENT NOTES
A CONSIDERATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "THE LAW OF THE
CASE" IN KENTUCKY.
The use of the words "law of the case" as an answer to a sub-
sequent appeal in many comparatively recent cases before the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has aroused curiosity as to the principles
embodied in such a peremptory phrase. The first time it appeared in a
Kentucky opinion, as far as the writer has been able to ascertain, was
in 1851 in the case of Srims v. Reed and Wife.' Since the opinion in
that case the phrase has continued to appear as a rule of law, with
an occasional short statement of the reasons and purported principles
underlying its use.F
The doctrine, according to the Kentucky court, is that "one adjudi-
cation settles all errors relied upon for reversal, whether mentioned
in the opinion or not, and all errors lurking in the record on the first
appeal which might have been, but were not expressly, relied upon as
error."
3 The policy behind the doctrine is to put an end to litigation
and to prevent presentation of cases piecemeal.' West Virginia uses
res judicata as the basis.5 The Kentucky court does not state exactly
what is the legal basis but seems to place it on res juaicata,l just as
does the West Virginia court.
Although it was not until 1851 that the term appeared, the rule was
applied in this jurisdiction as early as 1802 in MeredithL v. Ularce.8
On the second appeal of this case the question arose as to how far back
in the proceedings and records the plaintiff could assign errors. It was
held that he could assign no errors which occurred before the suing
351 Ky. 51, 52 (1851).
2 See Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 4 S. W. (2d) 731 (1928).
The statement by Willis, J., at p. 634, that, "the doctrine . .. is well
developed and understood in this Jurisdiction", might be open to
argument.
Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 634, 4 S. W. (2d) 731 (1928).
Sowders v. Coleman, 223 Ky. 633, 4 S. W. (2d) 731 (1928); Ball v.
Middlesboro Bottling Works, 266 Ky. 864, 99 S. W. (2d) 205 (1936).
"Johnson v. Gould, 62 W. Va. 599, 59 S. E. 611 (1907). See also
(1934) 41 W. Va. Law Quarterly 74-75.
6 Howard v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 372, 385, 70 S. W. 1055 (1902);
Legrand v. Baker, 22 Ky. 235, 244 (1827).
Brown v. Marion National Bank, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 186, 35 S. W. 926
(1896); Hopkins v. Adam Roth Grocery Co., 105 Ky. 357, 49 S. W. 18
(1899); Bassett v. Bassett, 179 Ky. 567, 200 S. W. 915 (1918); Ball v.
Middlesboro Bottling Works, 266 Ky. 364, 99 S. W. (2d) 205 (1936);
Castleman v. Buckner, 180 Ky. 350, 202 S. W. 681 (1918).
'2 Ky. (Sneed) 189 (1802).
The preface of this reporter states that this was the first volume
published under the authority of the Kentucky Legislature.
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out of the first writ of error. This holding states precisely the doctrine
of the law of the case. From 1802 to 1851 several cases held that an
appellant could not on a second appeal question the rulings made by the
court on the first appellate hearing.' The transition from an application
of the rule without naming it to the use of the rule under the term of
"law of the case", seems to have taken place without any explanation
by the court as to the origin of the term.
Considering the doctrine on principle it is possible to recognize
eomponent parts of two distinct legal principles: (1) res judicata-
invoked primarily for reasons of public policy to end litigation and
(2) stare decisis-a maxim more or less binding every judge to follow
what has been decided before him.
While the law of the case has been said to be stronger than stare
deci. is In that it dispenses with the need of considering again what
has been previously decided in the same suit, and weaker than res
judficata since it is without force beyond the particular case and does
not limit the power of the court," this would not seem to hold true in
Kentucky, since this state apparently uses res judicata as the basis.
Once applied, it precludes a consideration of facts, rulings, objections
or contentions that might have been relied on for reversal on the first
appeal' by the exercise of reasonable diligence by the parties."
The Kentucky court has assumed that it has no legal power to
change or modify its former ruling" and says the former opinion is
equally binding on the court as well as the parties,' yet the United
States Supreme Court has held the doctrine, in the absence of a statute,
not to be a limit to a court's power." Conceding that it is not a limit
to a court's power, our court follows the doctrine rather strictly and
will not exercise the power whether former conclusions were right
or wrong.'
Even though the rule as set forth In the first appeal has been over-
'Rowland v. Craig, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 330 (1804); Morgan v. Dicker-
son's Heirs, 17 Ky. 20 (1824); Legrand v. Baker, 22 Ky. 235, 244 (1827).
* Lummus, The "Law of the Case" in Massachusetts, (1929) 9
3oston Univ. Law Rev. 225.
See also Southern Railway Co. v. Clift, 260 U. S. 316, 319 (1922).
n Correll v. People's Bank, 246 Ky. 356, 55 S. W. (2d) 8 (1932).
" Blanton v. Wilson, 234 Ky. 637, 28 S. W. (2d) 970 (1930).
"Chandler v. Riggs, 3 Ky. Opin. 77 (1868).
11 Wheeler v. Cin., N. 0. & Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 171 Ky. 436, 188 S. W.
462 (1916).
5Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U. S. 436 (1912).
See p. 444 where Holmes, J., says, "This court, (U. S. Supreme
Court) at least, is free when the case comes here."
" Graziani v. Ambrose, 201 Ky. 466, 257 S. W. 21 (19,23); Great
American Ins. Co. v. Clayton, 266 Ky. 409, 99 S. W. (2d) 172 (1936).
Note (1930) 67 A. L. R. 1390.
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ruled in a subsequent case,'- the first opinion is the law of that case on
the second appeal. This refusal to reverse an erroneous decision which
has been overruled before the second appeal, may work a hardship in
isolated cases but such a refusal has a foundation outside of the one
usually relied upon by the courts." Since the court has handed down
an opinion on the case and the other party has relied upon it as being
final, the present appellant should not be allowed to question it but
should be precluded from unsettling what has been fittingly determined.
The present appellant had his opportunity on the first trial to present
all his pleadings, theories, and evidence, and to make all objections.
On the first appeal he had opportunity to present all his arguments,
therefore he should not be allowed to say on the second appeal that he
now has a stronger argument for his case. Litigants should be able to
rely on an opinion of a court of last resort as having some finality, even
if sometimes lacking in infallibility.
Today, Kentucky by reason of having only one appellate court, can
not be criticized for a manifestly unjust application of the law of the
case as can many states which have more than one appellate court.
In some states having a series of appellate courts, the decision of the
intermediate court is the law of the case on appeal to the court of last
resort. In others the rule obtains that the court of last resort is not
bound by an opinion of an intermediate court.' The present trend
seems to be in favor of the rule that an intermediate opinion is not
binding on the court of last resort when the first decision was errone-
ous.F Although Kentucky can have no intermediate appellate court
without a constitutional amendment," there was at one time the
Superior Court which was an intermediate court.' During the life
of this court its opinion was the law of the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals and a Court of Appeals decision was conclusive on the
Superior Court on a subsequent appeal of the same case.2 The Superior
Court clung just as tenaciously to the law of the case doctrine in apply-
27 Brown v. Marion Natl. Bank, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 186, 35 S. W. 926
(1896). The first opinion in this case in 92 Ky. 607 was overruled by
Sydner v. Mt. Sterling Bank, 94 Ky. 231 (1893).
Cain v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 123 Ky. 59, 93 S. W. 622 (1906).
The first opinion in this case In 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1712, 56 S. W. 724, was
overruled by Insurance Co. v. Spinks, 119 Ky. 261, 84 S. W. 1160 (1904)
13 See Bradford v. Patterson, 8 Ky. 464 (1819) for the court's expla-
nation on the basis of "political necessity".
"" For present state of the law on this point see Note and annota-
tions 118 A. L. R. 1286.
*"See Note (1934) 41 W. Va. Law Quarterly 74-75, for a note on a
recent West Virginia case.
For a note on a recent Texas case, see Note (1936) 14 Texas L.
Rev., 511-518.
21 Ky. Constitution (1892), section 135; see also, sec. 109.
2 The Superior Court was created in 1882 (See Gen. Stat. p. 348-
Bullitt and Feland, 1888) but abolished by Kentucky Constitution
(1892), section 119.
"Adams Express Co. v. Hoeing, 88 Ky. 373, 11 S. W. 205 (1889).
-"Berry v. City of Newport, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 438 (1885).
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ing It to its opinions- as does the present day Court of Appeals. It
would seem that there is justifiable criticism of the rule when applied
so as to give intermediate courts power over the court of last resort,
since a party should have the benefit of an opinion by the court of last
resort when he is otherwise entitled to an appeal to the highest court.
Just what is the law of a particular case one can not venture to
say until the Court of Appeals has ruled in that case. However, we
may gather from the multitude of decisions that when one fails to
object to evidence and does not complain on the first appeal as to its
admission, he is estopped to allege error on its admission in a second
trlal;6 where the facts and circumstances on the second and third trial
In respect to issue are substantially the same as those on the first trial,
the first opinion becomes the law of the case; - the opinion on the first
appeal settles the question as to sufficiency of pleading;8 and instruc-
tions given on the first trial and approved in the first opinion become
the law of the case and can not be considered on the second appealj
but if the opinion is only on a demurrer and the factual situation pre-
sented by answer and trial is different, the doctrine does not apply.
The doctrine itself is one that is strongly supported by legal prin-
ciples and in a jurisdiction such as Kentucky where there is only one
appellate court, which is the court of last resort, the doctrine of neces-
sity must be applied strictly or else the court will be continually review-
ing its own decisions. The rule does put a burden on the bar, but not
an undue one. It is the duty of every attorney to prepare thoroughly
his client's case for trial, to conduct the trial in an expert manner, and
on the first appeal to present his whole case and every just argument
therefor. Though the doctrine works a hardship in a particular case,
a criticism of the rule is net justified when the doctrine is thoroughly
analyzed with a view to following the most equitable course. Even
though the court seems to say that it has no alternative but to follow
the rule, certainly the court may make use of its sound discretion as to
whether an application of the law of the case is equitable in a given
instance.
As has been previously stated, in rare cases where a subsequent
opinion has overruled the first, the most equitable course for the
court to follow Is to uphold the first opinion as the law of that case.
Any other rule would tend to inject uncertainty into the law. Parties
should not have their rights prejudiced by a court later reversing its
previous decision so as to necessitate a restitution of property to the
disadvantage of the party who has relied on the first holding.
- Mt. Sterling and 0. Turnpike Co. v. Hamilton, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 720
(1893); Miles and Co. v. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 92 (1894).
C. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Lang's Admrx., 141 Ky. 592, 133 S. W. 570
(1911).
Ky. Road Oiling Co. v. Sharp, 257 Ky. 278, 78 S. W. (2d) 38 (1934).
Correll v. People's Bank, 246 Ky. 356, 55 S. W. (2d) 8 (1932).
NTemplin v. Cornelius, 243 Ky. 719, 49 S. W. (2d) 550 (1932).
N Title Ins. and Trust Co. v. McCracken County, 263 Ky. 302, 92
S. W. (2d) 89 (1936).
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However, since the rule applies also to criminal cases," it is
believed that should a subsequent decision overrule the first opinion
in a criminal case, the court should refuse to apply the law of the case
when such application would exact an unjust penalty. Equitabe con-
siderations should be paramount in any application of the law of the
case doctrine. JoHN L. YouNG
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE KENTUCKY MUNICI-
PAL HOUSING COMMISSION ACT.
Housing legislation in the United States probably had its birth in
the state of New York, where the first of a series of Tenement House
Laws was passed in 1867,1 providing that it was illegal to build a tene-
ment house covering one hundred per cent of a lot, that a ten-foot yard
had to be left at the rear for light and air, and that a wholly subter-
ranean room could not be rented for human habitation. Kentucky
passed its first Housing Law in 1910,2 the act being limited to cities of
the first class, that is, Louisville. The law had merely to do with limit-
ing the specifications of houses with relation to the size of the lots
they occupied, with certain provisions as to light, ventilation, and fire-
prevention. In 1920, the Kentucky Housing Act' was passed. This act
still applied only to cities of the first class, and did not effect any
appreciable change in the existing law. This act was repealed in
1922. 4
The National Industrial Recovery Act of 19335 laid the foundation
for the present housing law in Kentucky. This act provided for certain
grants of funds to states which would enact laws providing for low-cost
housing projects. Passed in order to take advantage of the grants
offered by the federal law, the Kentucky Municipal Housing Commis-
sion Act 6 provides that cities of the first and second class be authorized
"to acquire, establish, erect, maintain and operate low-cost housing
projects within the corporate limits of such municipality . . . for the
purpose of providing adequate and sanitary living quarters for indi-
viduals and families"; that as a matter of legislative determination
and "in order to promote and protect the health, safety, morals, and
welfare of the public, it is necessary in the public interest to confer
these powers upon the cities"; that the cities may create a Municipal
Housing Commission with the power to engage in low-cost housing and
slum clearance projects, fixing rental rates, and establishing rules and
by-laws governing the use of the premises included in the project; that
the commission may acquire the land it deems necessary for the
project, either by agreement with the owners, or by condemnation
'aWedding v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 115, 290 S. W. 1059 (1927).
'New York Laws 1867, c. 908.
2 Kentucky Acts 1910, c. 41, p. 120.
3Kentucky Acts 1920, c. 68.
4 Kentucky Acts 1922, c. 123.
548 Stat. 95, 40 U.S.C.A. (Supp.) c. 8.
6 Kentucky Acts 1934, c. 113.
